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WHY CONGRESS DID NOT THINK ABOUT THE 
CONSTITUTION WHEN ENACTING THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
Neal Devins* 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the next few months, the Supreme Court will spend far more time 
thinking about the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA)1 than Congress did when enacting the ACA.  Lawmakers 
largely ignored the Constitution; congressional hearings never considered 
whether the Supreme Court would uphold the statute nor did lawmakers 
engage in constitutional fact-finding.  Instead, consistent with the 
conclusions in my recent Northwestern University Law Review article, 
Party Polarization and Congressional Committee Consideration of 
Constitutional Questions (“Party Polarization”),2 lawmakers were far more 
invested in advancing the partisan aims of their party than sorting out the 
constitutional implications of the signature legislative accomplishment of 
the 111th Congress. 
In this Essay, I will provide a descriptive account of Congress’s 
general disinterest in the Constitution when enacting the ACA.  In so doing, 
this Essay will serve as a case study that bolsters the claims and evidence in 
my Party Polarization article.  This Essay is but one in a series on party 
polarization and committee behavior regarding the Constitution.  In a 
forthcoming essay that will appear in the print pages of the Northwestern 
University Law Review, I will extend this Essay’s case study to make 
broader claims about the impact of party polarization on Congress’s interest 
in federalism, including congressional fact-finding on bills which implicate 
constitutional federalism. 
This Essay will proceed in three parts.  In Part I, I will provide a 
snapshot of my earlier Party Polarization article, explaining why party 
polarization is likely to deflate congressional committee consideration of 
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1
  Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Reconciliation Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.) (link). 
2
  Neal Devins, Party Polarization and Congressional Committee Consideration of Constitutional 
Questions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 737 (2011) (link). 
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constitutional questions.  This occurs, for example, when majority 
lawmakers will not allow minority lawmakers to use constitutional hearings 
as a vehicle to derail the majority party’s legislative agenda. 
In Part II, which is the heart of this Essay, I will examine the 
congressional hearings, committee reports, and congressional debates tied 
to the enactment of the ACA.  While I will focus primarily on lawmaker 
consideration of the scope of congressional power under the Commerce 
Clause, I will also discuss congressional fact-finding.  This section will put 
into context the Department of Justice’s claims of “detailed findings” made 
by Congress establishing that the ACA was an appropriate “exercise of its 
commerce power.”3  In particular, this section will show that Congress 
never meaningfully considered the constitutionality of the ACA and that 
these “detailed findings” are largely smoke and mirrors which, more than 
anything, speak to the skill of Department of Justice lawyers in culling the 
Act’s massive legislative history for useful references.4 
Finally, Part III will discuss Congress’s actions after enactment of the 
ACA, including holding the first round of hearings about the bill’s 
constitutionality.  By highlighting the role of the 2010 elections and post-
enactment judicial rulings in Congress’s decision to hold hearings, this 
section will provide a fitting conclusion that reinforces the idea that 
Congress is generally uninterested in constitutional questions.  I will also 
highlight the costs of such indifference, arguing that the ACA would be on 
stronger constitutional footing if Congress had used the hearings process to 
take seriously its obligation to independently interpret the Constitution. 
Needless to say, this Essay—like the Party Polarization article that 
preceded it—presents a negative portrait of Congress, at least with respect 
to its consideration of constitutional questions.  At the same time, I am not 
suggesting that the ACA is unconstitutional.  I do not think that there is 
such a thing as due process in lawmaking, such that Congress would be 
obligated to hold hearings, find facts in hearings, or follow other procedural 
requirements.5  Moreover, I think that existing Supreme Court doctrine 
 
3
  Brief for Appellants at 2, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th 
Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3306 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (Nos. 11-11021 & 11-11067) (link). 
4
  For a somewhat competing account, see Rebecca E. Zietlow, Democratic Constitutionalism and 
the Affordable Care Act, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1367 (2011) (link).  Professor Zietlow, looking at statements 
made on the floor of Congress about the constitutionality of the ACA, suggests that Congress did take 
the Constitution into account when enacting the ACA.  See id. at 1395–1401.  Professor Zietlow, 
however, does not examine the legislative process leading up to that floor debate.  For reasons discussed 
both in this Essay and in Party Polarization, statements made in the Congressional Record are an 
inadequate measure of Congress’s interest in the Constitution.  See infra note 51; Devins, supra note 2, 
at 766–68.  More than that, although Professor Zietlow does an excellent job showcasing the number of 
lawmakers who spoke about the constitutionality of the ACA, I nonetheless argue in this Essay that 
lawmakers were not particularly interested in constitutional questions when debating the ACA.  See 
infra notes 51–56 and accompanying text. 
5
  See Neal Devins, Appropriations Redux: A Critical Look at the Fiscal Year 1988 Continuing 
Resolution, 1988 DUKE L.J. 389, 400–06 (arguing that there is no “due process in lawmaking” 
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supports the ACA.6  In other words, rather than call into question the 
constitutionality of the ACA, my true aim is to cast light on party 
polarization’s pernicious impact on Congress’s ability to independently 
interpret the Constitution. 
I. BACKGROUND: PARTY POLARIZATION AND CONGRESSIONAL 
COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS7 
A. A Polarized Congress 
Congressional hearings and, more generally, the work of congressional 
committees, provide an important lens for understanding lawmaker interest 
in constitutional questions.  Congressional committees, along with political 
parties, are one of the two “principal organizing structures of Congress.”8  
Although the relative influence of committees and political parties has 
varied over time, it has always been the case that “[m]uch of the important 
work of Congress is done in committees.”9  “[T]he connections between 
public attention and hearings, and between hearings and statutes, strongly 
suggest the general sensitivity of the lawmaking process to public 
priorities.”10  Hearings, moreover, are a relatively accessible source of 
information about Congress.  Unlike informal contacts among staffers, 
members, lobbyists, and agency officials, hearings are public events.  For 
all of these reasons, hearings—especially hearings on landmark 
 
requirement that lawmakers must have an opportunity to review legislation before voting on it) (link).  
For additional discussion, see infra notes 58–61 (noting that ACA legislative history calls attention to 
the near impossibility of courts mandating due process in lawmaking). 
6
  On how existing Supreme Court precedent supports the ACA (at least with respect to facial 
challenges to the statute), see Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 549 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(Sutton, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (link).  I have previously written on 
whether the Supreme Court should defer to congressional fact-finding in the federalism context, 
concluding that Congress’s interest in sorting the facts in federalism-related legislation is highly 
contextual and that the Court should embrace standards of review that allow it to look at that context 
before deciding whether deference is appropriate.  See Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the 
Scope of Judicial Review, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1194–1200 (2001) (link).  I have also written on the 
absence of a federalism constituency in Congress and, with it, the need for the Court to police federalism 
values through its decision-making.  See Neal Devins, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 99 NW. 
U. L. REV. 131, 135–39 (2004) (link).  Finally, I have registered my view that existing Supreme Court 
doctrine supports the ACA by signing a law professor amicus brief.  See Brief of Law Professors Barry 
Friedman, Matthew Adler, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners and Reversal on the 
Minimum-Coverage Provision Issue, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, cert. granted 132 
S.Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 160237 (link). 
7
  Much of this section is drawn from my Party Polarization article, supra note 2. 
8
  John H. Aldrich & David W. Rohde, Congressional Committees in a Continuing Partisan Era, in 
CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 217, 217 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 9th ed. 2009). 
9
  Keith E. Whittington, Hearing About the Constitution in Congressional Committees, in CONGRESS 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 87, 87 (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., 2005). 
10
  BRYAN D. JONES & FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, THE POLITICS OF ATTENTION: HOW 
GOVERNMENT PRIORITIZES PROBLEMS 263 (2005). 
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legislation—provide a lens into the level that Congress thinks about the 
Constitution when enacting legislation. 
None of this is to say that hearings are a perfect measure of 
congressional interest in a subject.  For example, Congress increasingly 
operates “without the benefit of hearings . . . [or even] deliberation in 
committee.”11  This is particularly true today; reductions in committee staff 
and a shift towards centralized party control have diminished the overall 
importance of committee work.  But even if hearings play a less prominent 
role in congressional deliberations, it is nevertheless true that hearings 
remain one of the most visible mechanisms for lawmakers to take “action in 
the public sphere.”12  “In hearings,” Keith Whittington notes, “legislators 
put political relationships and concerns on display and establish the 
warrants of authority for legislative action.”13 
With respect to constitutional questions, congressional practices 
changed dramatically between 1970 and 2010.14  Although committees 
routinely considered constitutional questions for the first twenty years of 
that period, starting around 1990—and especially following the 1995 
Republican takeover of Congress—there was a notable decline in the 
number of constitutional hearings.  Indeed, while there were more than 
sixty constitutional hearings each year for most years between 1970 and 
1985, there were fewer than forty constitutional hearings most years 
between 1995 and 2010.15  During that same period, moreover, the House 
and Senate Judiciary Committees became the only committees to regularly 
conduct constitutional hearings.  This meant that the Judiciary Committees 
held 72% of constitutional hearings between 1995 and 2010, compared to 
46% during the 1970s.16 
In making sense of these two trends, I think it is sensible to pay 
attention to the most obvious and recognizable development in Congress 
over the past forty years—the ever-growing polarization between the 
Democratic and Republican parties.17  The Congress that enacted the ACA 
 
11
  THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW CONGRESS IS FAILING 
AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK 217 (2006). 
12
  Whittington, supra note 9, at 88 (quoting DAVID R. MAYHEW, AMERICA’S CONGRESS: ACTION IN 
THE PUBLIC SPHERE, JAMES MADISON THROUGH NEWT GINGRICH (2000)).  
13
  Id. 
14
  See Devins, supra note 2, at 741–53, for a detailed presentation of the data summarized in this 
paragraph. 
15
  From 1985 to 1990, there was no overall decline.  The sustained decline (reflecting growing 
polarization in Congress) begins around 1990.  See id. at 743 fig.1. 
16
  Id. at 750.  From 1980 to 1994, Judiciary Committees held 56% of all constitutional hearings.  
Specifically, from 1985 to 1992, the Judiciary Committees held less than 50% of constitutional hearings, 
and the spike associated with the modern era begins around 1992 (again reflecting growing polarization 
in Congress).  See id. 
17
  For an excellent treatment of party polarization in Congress since the early 1970s, see generally 
SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS (2008).  In linking party polarization to 
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is much different than the Congress of 1970.  In 1970, with a strong 
contingent of conservative Southern Democrats, Democrats occupied every 
ideological niche.  Likewise, there were several liberal “Rockefeller 
Republicans.”  Indeed, throughout the 1970s, there was no meaningful gap 
in the median liberal-conservative scores of the two parties.  George 
Wallace thus justified his 1968 run for president by arguing that “there’s 
not a dime’s worth of difference” between the two parties.18 
Today, however, the forces that pushed Democrats and Republicans 
toward the center have given way to an era of ideological polarization.  
After Ronald Reagan’s presidential victory in 1980, the moderate-to-liberal 
wing of the Republican Party began to disappear.  “Ronald Reagan’s GOP” 
pursued a conservative agenda that simultaneously isolated the liberal wing 
of the Republican Party and appealed to right-leaning Southern Democrats, 
many of whom switched allegiance to the increasingly conservative 
Republican Party.  Computer-driven redistricting further exacerbated 
emerging polarization by drawing district lines that essentially guaranteed 
each party would win particular seats in the House of Representatives.  As a 
result, Democratic and Republican candidates sought to mobilize the more 
partisan bases that vote in party primaries, which pushed out moderates and 
rewarded candidates who were both more ideological and more loyal to 
their party.  By 1990, Congress was transformed; a sharp, ever-growing 
divide between the parties replaced the equally sharp gap between Northern 
and Southern members of each party.  This divide grew throughout the 
1990s and 2000s.  By 2009—and continuing through today—the 
ideological distance between the two parties was greater than at any time 
since Reconstruction.19 
B. Depressed Constitutional Interest and Partisan Aims 
Party polarization has resulted in a basic shift of power away from 
congressional committees and toward party leaders.  “As the views of 
members within [each] party become more alike, the costs of delegating 
 
changes in congressional constitutional hearing practices, I do not mean to suggest that party 
polarization is the only salient variable in the number and location of hearings.  As I explain in Party 
Polarization, supra note 2, at 768–75, changes in the national policy agenda, changes in party 
leadership, court decision-making, and presidential action all impact congressional practices—so there is 
year-to-year variability in congressional practices.  At the same time, party polarization explains the 
general decline in constitutional hearings and the related rise of the Judiciary Committees as the only 
committees to regularly hold constitutional hearings. 
18
  Richard Pearson, Ex-Gov. George C. Wallace Dies at 79, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1998, at A1. 
19
  Party polarization refers to the ideological distance between the average Democratic and 
Republican lawmakers based on roll call voting in the House and Senate.  In calculating party averages, 
roll call votes are registered as liberal, conservative, or moderate.  See Nolan McCarty et al., Party 
Polarization: 1879–2010, POLARIZED AM. (Jan. 11, 2011), 
http://polarizedamerica.com/Polarized_America.htm#POLITICALPOLARIZATION (link). 
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agenda power” to leadership diminishes.20  Leadership, for example, 
exercises greater control of the agenda and jurisdiction of committees.   
Leadership has also slashed committee staff and engaged in other reforms 
that have diminished committee influence.  Moreover, leadership has 
engaged in message politics—party efforts to use the legislative process to 
make symbolic statements to voters and other constituents. 
The interface of these factors largely explains the decline in 
constitutional hearings.21  With fewer staff resources and increasing intra-
party agreement, lawmakers (outside of the Judiciary Committees) are 
likely to focus on policy issues that reinforce their party’s message and shy 
away from constitutional questions that cast doubt on the legality of their 
handiwork.  More generally, lawmakers now have incentives to discount 
constitutional interpretation in favor of other pursuits—reelection, 
advancement within the party, and constituent service.  By way of contrast, 
Congress was more apt to hold constitutional hearings in the less polarized 
1960s and 1970s.  At that time, committee chairs had both more incentive 
to consider constitutional questions and more discretion to pursue a broader 
range of issues in committee hearings.  There was less pressure to pursue a 
party-defined message and substantially bigger staffs gave committees the 
resources to consider a broader range of issues in hearings.  Significantly, 
committee chairs needed to reach out to minority party members to form 
coalitions, recognizing the fact that some members of their own party 
disagreed with their policy priorities, creating a greater incentive to pursue 
hearings in a bipartisan way and resulting in committees that were more 
likely to consider the constitutional foundations of legislation. 
To make these points more concrete, consider the relationship between 
the majority and minority parties in defining the content of congressional 
hearings.  In today’s polarized Congress, Democrats and Republicans vote 
along party lines, pursue different agendas, and seek to advance their own 
messages while undermining those of the opposing party.  For this reason, 
the majority party is increasingly unwilling to allow opposition lawmakers 
to challenge the constitutionality of legislative proposals.  While legislative 
majorities have always controlled the policies and agendas of committee 
hearings, party polarization has nevertheless resulted in further limiting 
minority access to hearings.  In part, the majority party’s increasing 
homogeneity squelches competing views and thus makes hearings more 
one-sided.  Committee chairs can count on party loyalists to stick together 
 
20
  David W. Rohde et al., Parties, Committees, and Pivots: A Reassessment of the Literature on 
Congressional Organization 12 (Aug. 22, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Northwestern 
University Law Review).  For additional discussion, see Devins, supra note 2, at 756–59. 
21
  The issues explored in this and the next paragraphs are drawn from Party Polarization, Devins, 
supra note 2, at 759–68.  See also id. at 768–75 (noting that—notwithstanding the general decline in 
constitutional hearings—there are occasional spike-up years typically tied to presidential initiatives, 
court decisions, and changes in party control of Congress). 
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and, consequently, there is less reason to reach out to majority or minority 
party members who do not necessarily agree with the chair’s agenda.  When 
Republicans controlled Congress from 1995 to 2006, for example, 
Democratic lawmakers—shut out of the formal hearing process—held so-
called “shadow” hearings to protest their inability to call witnesses or 
otherwise define the hearing agenda.22  In all, with party leaders exercising 
greater control over the agenda and membership of committees, committee 
chairs have both less interest in and less freedom to pursue issues that are 
inconsistent with the interest of party leaders.  Against this backdrop, policy 
and constitutional objections to committee initiatives will likely come from 
the minority party.  Yet the majority party may not allow committee 
hearings to serve as a vehicle for airing such minority party objections. 
The Judiciary Committees, like other committees, are also polarized 
along party lines.  Judiciary Committee hearings are thus increasingly 
“stage-managed” and “orchestrated as political theater.”23  Unlike other 
committees, however, the confluence of jurisdiction, member preferences, 
and interest-group pressure has resulted in the Judiciary Committees 
continuing to hold constitutional hearings— the Judiciary Committees now 
hold more than 70% of constitutional hearings in Congress.  Most 
importantly, the Judiciary Committees cannot treat constitutional issues as 
second order, largely because they have jurisdiction over civil liberties, 
constitutional amendments, and federal courts (not to mention the Senate’s 
power to confirm federal judges and Justice Department officials).  
Moreover, with the general decline in congressional consideration of 
constitutional questions, lawmakers increasingly look to the courts as the 
last word on constitutional questions.  Other committees and party leaders, 
therefore, leave it to the Senate Judiciary Committee to advance party 
preferences through its confirmation power, either by advancing or blocking 
nominations.24  Increasing acrimony between the parties over federal 
appellate court nominations highlights this development. 
In summary, congressional committees increasingly use hearings to 
 
22
  See id. at 766–67. 
23
  Richard E. Cohen, Crackup of the Committees, 31 NAT’L. J. 2210, 2215 (1999) (link); ROGER H. 
DAVIDSON ET AL., CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 220 (11th ed. 2008).  For an examination of how party 
polarization transformed Judiciary Committee hearings so that each party would only call witnesses who 
would back up pre-defined party opinions, see Neal Devins, The Academic Expert Before Congress: 
Observations and Lessons from Bill Van Alstyne’s Testimony, 54 DUKE L.J. 1525, 1539–45 (2005) 
(link).  For a more detailed presentation of the issues raised in this paragraph, see Devins, supra note 2, 
at 776–82. 
24
  Today’s Congress—as Bruce Peabody found in his study of lawmaker attitudes toward Court-
Congress relations—no longer thinks that the Court should defer to its constitutional judgments.  Bruce 
G. Peabody, Congressional Constitutional Interpretation and the Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry into 
Legislative Attitudes, 1959–2001, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 127, 127 (2004) (link).  On the issue of party 
polarization in judicial confirmation politics, see Sarah A. Binder & Forrest Maltzmann, The Politics of 
Advice and Consent: Putting Judges on the Federal Bench, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra note 8, 
at 241–62. 
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advance the partisan goals of the majority party.25  With more intra-party 
agreement and fewer staff resources, committees generally focus on policy 
concerns and pay scant attention to the constitutional foundations of 
legislation.  Correspondingly, the minority party is both more likely to raise 
constitutional objections to legislation and less likely to have access to these 
hearings.  Outside of the Judiciary Committees, which continue to hold 
constitutional hearings, minority party members are most likely to express 
constitutional concerns through “shadow hearings,” floor statements 
published in the Congressional Record, and outreach efforts such as press 
releases and other public statements. 
II. CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
In Part I of this Essay, I explained why it is that party polarization has 
contributed to a decline in constitutional hearings outside of the Judiciary 
Committees.  I suggested that those committees would explore policy 
questions, not constitutional questions, and that constitutional objections to 
legislation would most likely appear on the pages of the Congressional 
Record.  In this Part, I will review congressional deliberations leading up to 
the passage of the ACA.  In so doing, I will show that the enactment of the 
ACA tracks general trends in Congress. 
To start, the 111th Congress held forty-four hearings about the ACA 
between its January 2009 opening and March 2010 enactment of the ACA.  
Lawmakers, however, did not hold any hearings to examine the bill’s 
constitutionality.  Also, although Congress specifically found that the 
ACA’s individual mandate “is commercial and economic in nature, and 
substantially affects interstate commerce,”26 it did not consider the linkage 
between the factual record it was assembling and applicable constitutional 
standards.  Instead, lawmakers seemed largely indifferent to a potential 
constitutional challenge to the ACA.  Given the political import of the 
ACA, the number of policy-related hearings held on the bill, and the advent 
of the Tea Party (whose questioning of the ACA’s constitutionality proved 
politically salient to the Republican Party),27 the fact that the Constitution 
played no meaningful role in congressional committee consideration of the 
ACA is striking. 
 
25
  For discussions of majority party control of hearings (including the tendency of the majority party 
to call witnesses to support pre-defined party messages), see Devins, supra note 2, at 766–67; Devins, 
supra note 23, at 1542–45; see also supra text accompanying note 22 (discussing minority party use of 
shadow hearings to protest their inability to call witnesses or otherwise define the agenda of committee 
hearings). 
26
  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended 
by Health Care and Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (to be 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091) (link).  
27
  For a discussion of the Tea Party and its attacks on the ACA, see sources cited infra note 49; see 
also Zietlow, supra note 4, at 1395–1401. 
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Party polarization figures significantly in this story.  First, for reasons 
discussed in Part I, party polarization has led to a diminution in 
congressional interest in the Constitution.  Second, with Republican 
lawmakers uniformly opposed to the bill, majority lawmakers worked hard 
to keep their coalition together.  To accomplish this feat, Democratic 
leaders focused on policy priorities; hearings about whether the bill was 
constitutional likely would have hurt, not helped, their cause.  Specifically, 
Democratic lawmakers could not risk any defections among their rank and, 
consequently, had nothing to gain by having bill opponents cast doubt on 
the constitutional bona fides of the bill.28 
The battle over the ACA was fiercely partisan.29  No Republican voted 
for the final bill in either the House or Senate.  As a result, Senate majority 
leader Harry Reid (D-NV) needed to craft a proposal that would be 
acceptable to all sixty Senate Democrats, so that the Democratic majority 
could invoke cloture and break Republican efforts to derail the bill through 
a filibuster.30  On the House side, majority leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) 
needed to secure the votes of 218 out of 258 House Democrats.  Facing 
some resistance from moderates within the party, Pelosi made 
compromises, including an agreement to allow pro-life Democrats and 
Republicans to vote on an amendment prohibiting the use of federal funds 
for abortion services except in cases of rape, incest, and danger to the 
woman’s life. 
The fact that Reid and Pelosi made such compromises to hold their 
base together does not cut against claims made in Part I.  While increasing 
homogeneity within each party is a hallmark of party polarization, party 
polarization does not foreclose some ideological variation within a party.  
 
28
  This failure, as Part III details, came at a cost.  Constitutionally focused hearings may have 
strengthened the bill’s constitutional foundation.  See infra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.  
Moreover, for reasons detailed infra text accompanying notes 37–42, this failure was not simply about 
political expediency.  Democratic lawmakers made no effort to use hearings to find facts that would help 
shore up the Act’s factual suppositions; these hearings would not have directly addressed the Act’s 
constitutionality and could probably have been pursued with little political cost.  For this very reason, 
Congress’s failure must be partially attributed to lawmaker disinterest in constitutional questions.  For 
additional discussion, see infra notes 39, 42. 
29
  For two excellent overviews of the legislative process tied to the enactment of the ACA, see Health 
Care Overhaul Makes History for Obama, Democratic Congress, in CQ ALMANAC 2010, at 9-3–9-5 
(Jan Austen ed., 2010), available at http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal10-
1278-70363-2371661 (link); Landmark Health Care Overhaul: A Long, Acrimonious Journey, in CQ 
ALMANAC 2009, at 13-3–13-14 (Jan Austin ed., 2009), available at 
http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal09-1183-59550-2251513 [hereinafter Landmark Health Care 
Overhaul] (link).  All factual claims in this and the next two paragraphs are supported by these two 
articles. 
30
  Indeed, with the election of Republican Scott Brown to fill Edward Kennedy’s Senate seat after 
Kennedy’s August 2009 death, Senate Democrats needed to enact the bill before Brown took office so 
that Democratic holdover appointment Paul Kirk could vote on the bill.  As a result, Reid kept the 
Senate in session for twenty-five consecutive days—with the final vote on the bill occurring on 
Christmas Eve 2009. 
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Instead, party polarization speaks to the general conformity of opinion 
within each party, the growing ideological distance between the two parties, 
and the likelihood that party members will vote with their leadership and 
against the other party.  No Republican voted in favor of the ACA; in fact, 
the party launched a nationwide campaign against what they derogatively 
called “Obamacare.”  Democrats, on the other hand, overwhelmingly 
supported the measure and backed party leaders.  Indeed, in the Senate, 
where all Democrats were needed to resist a Republican filibuster effort, the 
party voted as a unified block. 
The diminished status of congressional committees in the enactment of 
the ACA also supports the claims in Part I about the linkage between party 
polarization and the ascendancy of party leaders at the expense of 
committee chairs.  Pelosi deployed three House committees to work on the 
bill: Energy and Commerce, Education and Labor, and Ways and Means.  
In the Senate, Reid turned to the Finance Committee and the Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee.  Reid and Pelosi then 
“assembled their bills from the measures reported by their respective 
committees, selecting from among conflicting provisions and tweaking 
them again and again to corral voters.”31  With respect to constitutional 
issues, it is telling that neither the House nor Senate Judiciary Committees 
played any formal role.  Instead, policy-oriented committees—most 
notably, committees with jurisdiction over health and finance—pursued the 
bill. 
To make the connections between Part I and the ACA case study more 
explicit, I will now turn to the hearings, committee reports, and legislative 
debates that culminated in the enactment of the bill.  As I will show, 
congressional committees paid virtually no attention to constitutional 
questions in hearings or committee reports.  While there were occasional 
comments about the Constitution in legislative debates, these comments 
highlight the fact that minority members were not allowed to air 
constitutional grievances in the committee process.  In other words, the 
ACA case study reinforces points made in Part I and in my Party 
Polarization article; namely, party polarization has contributed to 
Congress’s declining interest in the Constitution.  Republican lawmakers’ 
unified opposition to the ACA highlights polarization in Congress and 
 
31
  Landmark Health Care Overhaul, supra note 29.  No doubt, party leaders in less polarized 
Congresses have also tweaked legislation in order to cobble together a majority.  At the same time, the 
fact that neither Reid nor Pelosi could reach out to Republican members is a hallmark of party 
polarization.  When Congress enacted the 1964 Civil Rights Act, for example, Democratic leadership 
worked together with Republican leadership, knowing that Southern Democrats stood together to block 
the legislation.  See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
NATIONAL POLICY 1960–1972, at 132–49 (1990).  Likewise (and consistent with claims made in Part I 
of this Essay), congressional committees were more likely to consider the factual suppositions of 
legislation when Congress was less polarized, including the question of whether Congress’s commerce 
power supported the enactment of legislation.  See id. at 87–95. 
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explains why majority leadership needed to resist all efforts to derail the 
bill, including the need to limit opportunities for minority lawmakers to 
challenge the bill on constitutional grounds. 
Twenty-two hearings tied to health care legislation were held in each 
chamber of Congress between January 20, 2009 and March 25, 2010, 
though none meaningfully considered the constitutionality of the ACA.32  
On the Senate side, the constitutionality of the statute was raised in only 
one hearing.33  In that hearing, held in May 2009 by the Senate Finance 
Committee, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) asked witness James Klein, 
President of the American Benefits Council, whether geographic variations 
in tax rates based on state of residence would be constitutional.  Klein said 
that he did not know, but another witness—Edward Kleinbard, Chief of 
Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation—said that he thought Congress 
could constitutionally permit regional variations in tax rates.34  Kleinbard’s 
constitutional analysis was not part of a prepared statement and takes up 
nine sentences in the hearing record. 
House hearings tell an identical tale.  No witness testimony focused on 
constitutional questions, and only one witness answered a member question 
about the constitutionality of the ACA.  In a September 2009 hearing before 
a subcommittee of the House Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform, Representative Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) asked Michael Cannon, 
Director of Health Policy at the Cato Institute, whether the Constitution’s 
General Welfare Clause supported the enactment of the ACA.35  Cannon’s 
equivocal response takes up just seven sentences in the hearing record. 
That Congress did not explicitly consider the ACA’s constitutionality 
is only part of the story.  Lawmakers also did not use the hearings as a 
vehicle to meaningfully engage in fact-finding that would strengthen claims 
that the ACA regulates economic activity pursuant to Congress’s 
 
32
  My summer 2011 research assistant Brian Kelley prepared a memo listing each of these hearings, 
including an analysis of Congress’s pursuit of constitutional issues in these hearings.  His findings are 
summarized in Memorandum from Brian Kelley, Research Assistant, on Health Care Topic Two: What 
Congress Did in Enacting the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 22–29 (Aug. 4, 2011) (on file 
with the Northwestern University Law Review). 
33
  Roundtable Discussions on Comprehensive Health Care Reform: Hearings Before the S. Comm. 
on Fin., 111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter Roundtable Discussions] (link).  Outside of hearings on health 
care legislation, the only other reference in Senate hearings to the constitutionality of the ACA was a 
questionnaire submitted by Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK) to Health and Human Services nominee 
Kathleen Sebelius on whether Congress had constitutional authority to enact national health care 
legislation.  In her written response, Sebilius expressed support for the bill without addressing the 
constitutional question.  See Nomination of Governor Kathleen Sebelius: Hearing. Before the S. Comm. 
on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 111th Cong. 92 (2009) (link). 
34
  Roundtable Discussions, supra note 33, at 137 (testimony of Edward Kleinbard, Chief of Staff, 
Joint Comm. on Taxation). 
35
  Between You and Your Doctor: The Private Health Insurance Bureaucracy: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. 139 (2009) 
(statement of Michael F. Cannon, Director of Health Policy Studies, Cato Institute) (link). 
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Commerce Clause power.  Lawmakers made no effort to link committee 
fact-finding to Supreme Court decision-making.  Moreover, while the 
evidence is more ambiguous, there is very little evidence in the hearing 
record that suggests lawmakers were interested in establishing a factual 
predicate for the idea of a national health insurance marketplace in which 
all groups and individuals must participate.  Lawmakers, instead, were 
concerned almost exclusively with the technical provisions of the bill and 
how those would affect health care going forward. 
The fact that lawmakers and their constituents are more interested in 
economic issues than constitutional issues is hardly surprising.  It is 
nonetheless striking that lawmakers made no effort to use hearings to 
establish facts—closely linked to the subjects of the hearings—that would 
help shore up the ACA’s constitutional foundation.  After all, with the rise 
of the Tea Party, majority lawmakers were on notice that there would be a 
constitutional challenge to the ACA.36  The failure of congressional 
committees to use hearings to reinforce the ACA’s factual predicates 
therefore speaks to committee disinterest in the Constitution; a disinterest 
that tracks larger congressional trends.  These trends, as detailed in Part I, 
are correlated with party polarization. 
In examining congressional fact-finding, my research assistant Sam 
Mann and I looked at hearings in the 110th Congress (after Democrats took 
majority control of Congress in 2007 and held thirty hearings related to 
possible reforms of the health care system), and in the 111th Congress 
(from January 2009, when Obama took office, to March 2010, when 
Congress enacted the ACA).37  As noted above, no hearing explicitly 
referenced constitutional standards or specifically sought to demonstrate 
that all individuals—whether or not they purchase health insurance—are 
part of the national health insurance marketplace.38 Eleven hearings did, 
however, address the national marketplace, and we focused our attention 
there.  Of the eleven, seven were held in the 110th Congress and four in the 
111th Congress. 
 
36
  See infra notes 4949–51 and accompanying text. 
37
  Sixty individual hearings were examined (the transcripts of some hearings were not available on 
any of the major databases).  In other words, while our research is fairly comprehensive, there may be 
some limitations resulting from data availability.  The research is summarized in Memorandum from 
Sam Mann, Research Assistant, on Fact-Finding on National Marketplace in ACA (Nov. 2011) (revised) 
(on file with the Northwestern University Law Review).  All factual assertions in this paragraph are 
drawn from this memo. 
38
  One witness alluded to the Constitution when discussing the feasibility of a plan that included the 
individual mandate.  Dr. James Mongan, in testimony discussing Massachusetts’s experience with an 
individual mandate program, said the individual mandate was “tricky” business because “there are some 
on the right who attack it because they do not even want to mandate motorcycle helmets, let alone 
premium payments.”  Charting a Course for Health Care Reform: Moving Toward Universal Coverage, 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong. 30 (2007) (testimony of James J. Mongan, M.D., 
President, Partners HealthCare) (link). 
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The overall focus of all of these hearings was the need for Congress to 
reform health care.  On the questions surrounding the national marketplace 
for insurance, there was very little direct fact-finding.  Lawmakers were 
primarily concerned with issues such as Medicare, expanding coverage, 
achieving the support of insurers, and eliminating waste in the system.39  In 
these eleven hearings that touched on the national marketplace, the 
committee members and witnesses often referred to subjects that may prove 
relevant to constitutional litigation over the ACA—including expanding 
participation pools, the notion of voluntary markets, the need for universal 
care, and the economic benefits that a new nation-wide system could 
provide. 
There is some testimony regarding problems with the existing system 
of state regulation, such that establishing a national health insurance 
marketplace would benefit the health care system as a whole.40  There is 
also testimony regarding the effect of decisions to opt out of the national 
market, usually made by the young and healthy, which leave the old and 
infirm still in the market with higher premiums.41  However, there is no 
testimony regarding the connection between mandatory participation and a 
national market.  In other words, there are only bits and pieces in these 
congressional hearings that address the need for a national health insurance 
marketplace in which the young and healthy cannot opt out.  There is, 
however, no systematic effort to explore this question or, more generally, to 
consider whether those who opt out of health insurance nevertheless remain 
players in the national health care marketplace.  These considerations are 
very much at the core of the current debate over the constitutionality of the 
ACA.  Congress’s failure to formally consider them—and, in so doing, 
shore up the ACA’s constitutional foundation—suggests that constitutional 
 
39
  This is to be expected, given the power of the health insurers lobby and other economic interests 
impacted by the ACA.  At the same time, Congress’s failure to consider at all the Act’s constitutional 
underpinnings is striking and highly suggestive of congressional disinterest in the Constitution.  In 
particular, lawmakers could have asked witnesses to testify about the impact of the uninsured on the 
national health care marketplace.  This testimony, for reasons noted in Part III, would have been useful 
to Department of Justice lawyers defending the statute.  See infra notes 6969–71.  Moreover, there is no 
reason to think that calling such witnesses would come at a cost to majority lawmakers.  Even if 
minority lawmakers questioned their analyses, these witnesses—so long as their fact-finding was 
methodologically sound—should have been able to respond to such questioning. 
40
  See America’s Need for Health Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong. 34, 49 (2008) (statement of Stephen T. Parente, 
Director, Medical Industry Leadership Institute) (link). 
41
  See Health Care Reform: Recommendations to Improve Coordination of Federal and State 
Initiatives: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health, Emp’t, Labor & Pensions of the H. Comm. on 
Educ. & Labor, 110th Cong. 46 (2007) (statement of Steven Goldman, Comm’r, New Jersey 
Department of Banking and Insurance) (link); Roundtable Discussions, supra note 33, at 542 (statement 
of Scott Serota, President & Chief Executive Officer, Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association). 
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issues did not register with lawmakers and their staff.42 
Congressional committee reports similarly suggest that lawmakers paid 
scant attention to the Constitution when enacting the ACA.  Not one of the 
twenty reports issued by the 110th and 111th Congresses formally 
addresses the constitutionality of the statute.43  None of the four Senate 
Reports make any reference to the Constitution.  In the House, institutional 
rules require a “statement citing the specific powers granted to Congress in 
the Constitution to enact the law proposed by the bill.”44  Notwithstanding 
this requirement, eleven of sixteen House Reports make no reference to the 
Constitution.  Of the five that do reference the Constitution, none does more 
than merely cite the House Rule and reference constitutional provisions that 
support enactment without substantive discussion.45 
Furthermore, committee reports show very little congressional fact-
finding overall, and they show no effort to link fact-finding to constitutional 
standards.46  Of the seven reports issued by the 111th Congress, most 
mention economic research on the need for health care reform.  One of the 
seven discusses the linkage between the costs of the uninsured and the 
national marketplace.  That report, by the Senate Finance Committee, cites 
“countless studies” about the economic ramifications of the uninsured—that 
23% of uninsured adults forego necessary care every year because of cost, 
and that the cost for those that do seek care is shifted to the insured.47 
What is striking here is that the ACA is the signature bill of the 111th 
Congress—a bill that Democrats pushed once taking over Congress in 
2007, a bill that builds upon the failed efforts of the Clinton administration 
to transform health care in the 1990s, and a bill that “Congressional 
Democrats and President Obama stake[d] their political fortunes on the 
 
42
  Moreover, there is no reason to think this failure was at all calculated as an effort to steer clear of 
a politically volatile issue.  For reasons noted supra note 39, majority lawmakers could have pursued 
this question with little or no political risk. 
43
  Committee reports were identified through two separate searches, a Lexis-Nexis Search and a 
Lexis/ProQuest Congressional search.  Some reports were listed in one search but not the other, and the 
analysis in this paragraph considers all potentially relevant reports, even if one or the other search did 
not list a particular report.  In other words, if anything, I overstate congressional committee references to 
the Constitution.  For additional discussion from which this paragraph is drawn, see Kelley, supra note 
32; E-mail from Frederick W. Dingledy, Reference Librarian, to author (Dec. 12, 2011) (on file with the 
Northwestern University Law Review). 
44
  CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 
UNITED STATES ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS, H.R. DOC. NO. 110-162, at 626 (2009) (House 
Rule XIII 3(d)(1)) (link). 
45
  All five reference the Commerce Clause, three reference the Necessary and Proper Clause, and 
two reference Congress’s taxing power under the Sixteenth Amendment. 
46
  Information in this paragraph is drawn from Mann, supra note 37. 
47
  S. REP NO. 111-89, at 2 (2009) (link).  In the same report, the Senate Finance Committee 
references the “hidden health tax,” where health premiums are increased in order to mitigate the 
“estimated $56 billion annually in uncompensated care to people without health insurance.” Id. 
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outcome.”48  It is not as if Congress rushed the bill through in the dark of 
night.  On the contrary, lawmakers held more than seventy hearings over 
the course of the 110th and 111th Congresses, and issued twenty committee 
reports during this time.  Moreover, congressional Democrats were well 
aware that the bill would be subject to a fierce constitutional attack both in 
the courts and on the campaign trail, where Republicans (buoyed by Tea 
Party opposition to the ACA) would trash the bill as unconstitutional 
governmental overreaching.49  From July to September 2009, opinion pieces 
in the Washington Post and Wall Street Journal, and an online debate in 
Politico all flagged potential constitutional problems with the ACA.50  Over 
the next several months, questions about the constitutionality of the ACA 
did anything but abate.  Pieces focusing on the very same constitutional 
issues now before the Supreme Court appeared in many places, including 
law blogs, mainstream newspapers, and interest group reports. 
Against this backdrop, the failure of congressional committees to either 
consider the bill’s constitutionality or to formally engage in fact-finding 
designed to shore up the bill’s constitutional foundation is stunning.  At the 
same time, this failure is not surprising.  The ACA exemplifies the ways 
that party polarization undermines congressional interest in the 
Constitution.  The confluence of growing committee disinterest in the 
Constitution and the political necessity of holding the majority coalition 
together proved to be a perfect storm of the costs and consequences of party 
polarization. 
Congressional debates over the ACA reinforce this conclusion.  With 
no opportunity to use the committee process to attack the ACA’s 
constitutional foundation, minority lawmakers turned to the floor of 
Congress to air their grievances.  At the same time, declining lawmaker 
interest in the Constitution meant that policy—not constitutional—concerns 
 
48
  Landmark Health Care Overhaul, supra note 29. 
49
  For a discussion of Tea Party opposition to the bill, see John Fritze et al., The Health Care Bill’s 
8 Key Moments, USA TODAY, Mar. 25, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2010-03-25-
health-care-moments_N.htm (link).  For a discussion of Tea Party efforts to link their opposition to the 
ACA and other governmental programs with their vision of constitutional federalism, see Ilya Somin, 
The Tea Party Movement and Popular Constitutionalism, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 300 (2011) 
(link), Zietlow, supra note 4, at 1367–68, 1395–97; Jill Lepore, The Commandments: The Constitution 
and Its Worshippers, NEW YORKER, Jan. 17, 2011, http://www.newyorker.com/arts/ 
critics/atlarge/2011/01/17/110117crat_atlarge_lepore (link); Adam J. White, The Tea Party’s 
Constitution, WEEKLY STANDARD, Aug. 29, 2011, http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/tea-party-s-
constitution_590449.html (link).  
50
  See JENNIFER STAMAN & CYNTHIA BROUGHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REQUIRING 
INDIVIDUALS TO OBTAIN HEALTH INSURANCE: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (2009) [hereinafter CRS 
REPORT] (link); Andrew P. Napolitano, Health-Care Reform and the Constitution, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
15, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203917304574412793406386548.html 
(link); David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Illegal Health Reform, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2009, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/21/AR2009082103033.html?sub=AR 
(link); Healthcare: Is “Mandatory Insurance” Unconstitutional?, POLITICO (Sept. 18, 2009), 
http://www.politico.com/arena/archive/healthcare-reform-constitutionality.html (link). 
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were the overwhelming focus of ACA legislative debates.  Furthermore, to 
the extent that minority lawmakers invoke the Constitution, they do so to 
derail legislative initiatives that they oppose on policy grounds.  These very 
same lawmakers conveniently ignore the Constitution when their party is in 
the majority.51 
These debates over health care legislation spanned twenty-five days 
and totaled 790 pages.52  Twenty-five entries explicitly discussed the 
constitutionality of the statute.53  Sixteen of these entries take up 
substantially less than one page in the Congressional Record.  Of the nine 
entries that take up more than one page, seven contain articles that were 
submitted to the Congressional Record.  None of the twenty-five entries 
discussed congressional fact-finding.  Separate searches for the terms 
“marketplace,” “unavoidable,” and “voluntary” only turned up a handful of 
lawmaker comments regarding the idea of a national marketplace for health 
insurance.54 
Even though lawmakers spent virtually no time examining 
constitutional issues when debating health care legislation, it is nevertheless 
true that Republican lawmakers—largely shut out in the committee 
process—aired their constitutional grievances on the floor of Congress.  Six 
House Republicans and four Senate Republicans questioned the bill’s 
constitutionality in floor debates.55  The fact that so few Republican 
lawmakers spoke to the bill’s constitutionality (as compared to the very 
large number who spoke out against the bill in floor debates)56 again 
highlights the currently polarized Congress’s disinterest in constitutional 
issues. 
The Supreme Court should not find the ACA unconstitutional simply 
because Congress failed to hold constitutional hearings, formally engage in 
constitutional fact-finding, or meaningfully debate the constitutionality of 
the bill.  The Constitution, as noted, does not impose “due process in 
 
51
  See Devins, supra note 2, at 746–47 (noting a decline in constitutional hearings irrespective of 
which party is in the majority); id. at 766–67 (noting that, in today’s polarized Congress, constitutional 
objections to the majority party’s legislative initiatives are made by minority party lawmakers). 
52
  Information in this paragraph is drawn from Kelley, supra note 32; Mann, supra note 37. 
53
  Entries refer to headings in the Congressional Record.  Most entries feature comments by only 
one member but some entries feature statements by several members. 
54
  See Mann, supra note 37.  In defending the statute, the Department of Justice referenced these 
lawmaker comments as well as other available evidence from both the legislative record and from 
academic studies.  See infra text accompanying note 71. 
55
  See 156 CONG. REC. H177–83 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 2010) (statements of Reps. Garrett, Foxx, 
Broun, Gohmert, and Bishop) (link); 155 CONG. REC. S13,821-29 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 2009) (statements 
of Sens. Hutchison, Ensign, Hatch, and Kyl) (link); 155 CONG. REC. H12,429 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 2009) 
(statement of Rep. Poe) (link). 
56
  As noted earlier, legislative debates of the ACA took up 790 pages in the Congressional Record, 
nearly all of which focused on policy—not constitutional—issues. 
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lawmaking” obligations on Congress.57  Indeed, legislative action leading 
up to the ACA—as well as findings in the ACA itself—highlight the 
impossibility of imposing due process demands on Congress.  The 
legislative record, including witness statements and lawmaker comments, 
includes a handful of references to the national health care marketplace,58 
some of which suggest that the uninsured impact this marketplace.  More 
than that, the bill enacted by Congress includes eight specific findings to 
support claims that the ACA’s individual mandate is “commercial and 
economic” and “substantially affects interstate commerce.”59 
At the same time, for reasons I will detail in Part III, Congress could 
have improved the likelihood of a favorable decision by the Court if it had 
paid more attention to potential constitutional objections to the ACA.  
Instead, this ACA case study highlights both growing party polarization in 
Congress and one consequence of such polarization—the decline of 
lawmaker interest in the Constitution. 
III. WHY LAWMAKERS BECAME MORE INTERESTED IN THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACA AFTER THE NOVEMBER 2010 
ELECTIONS 
The House and Senate Judiciary Committees held constitutional 
hearings on the ACA in February 2011,60 about a year after enactment of the 
bill.  Indeed, Congress showed greater interest in the constitutionality of the 
ACA when the 112th Congress was seated (around January 2011) than at 
any time leading up to its enactment.61  This apparent upswing in 
 
57
  See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
58
  E.g., Covering the Uninsured: Making Health Insurance Markets Work: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. 30 (2008) (testimony of Kim Holland, Oklahoma Insurance Comm’r) 
(link). 
59
  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), 
amended by Health Care and Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (to 
be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091) (link).  In its briefs defending the ACA, the Department of Justice 
points to these legislative findings—as well as roughly eighteen references to the national health 
marketplace in hearings, debates, and reports during the 110th and 111th Congresses—to assert that “the 
legislative record leaves no doubt that [the ACA’s individual mandate] . . . is a valid exercise of the 
commerce power.”  See Brief for Appellants, supra note 3, at 25.  Department of Justice lawyers deserve 
great credit for culling the legislative record to make as convincing a case for the ACA as possible.  At 
the same time, the government’s brief (which intersperses academic studies along with legislative record 
material) is ultimately a “legislative collage” as opposed to legislative history.  Its collection of 
legislative findings, debate statements, committee hearings, legislative memos, and academic studies 
makes the best case possible for the ACA but does not, for reasons detailed in this section, counter the 
overwhelming evidence that lawmakers were not meaningfully engaged in constitutional analysis or 
constitutional fact-finding. 
60
  Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
112th Cong. (2011) (link); The Constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011). 
61
  In addition to the two hearings explicitly about the constitutionality of the ACA, there were 
mentions of the ACA’s constitutionality in twenty other hearings from March 26, 2010 to December 31, 
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congressional interest, however, underscores the adverse consequences of 
both party polarization and the related decline in lawmaker interest in 
constitutional questions.  More to the point, if lawmakers had shown this 
level of interest in constitutional questions before enacting the ACA, the 
bill would have a better chance of winning Supreme Court approval. 
Lawmaker interest in the constitutionality of the ACA was initially 
spurred by both the 2011 Republican takeover of the House of 
Representatives and by two federal district court rulings (in December 2010 
and January 2011) that the ACA overstepped Congress’s power to regulate 
interstate commerce.62  In part, Republican leadership in the House had 
incentive to use constitutional hearings as a mechanism to reinforce claims 
that theirs is the party of limited government, thereby criticizing the 
purported overreaching of the White House and congressional Democrats.  
During the 2010 election cycle, House Republican leadership embraced Tea 
Party calls for limited government by explicitly questioning the ACA’s 
constitutionality and embracing a proposal requiring every bill to include 
language citing its constitutional authority.  House Majority Leader John 
Boehner (R-OH) specifically attacked the “constitutionally suspect 
‘individual mandate’” and, relatedly, argued that a requirement that all bills 
cite specific constitutional authority could create a valuable “obstacle to 
expanded government.”63  Following the 2010 elections, House Republican 
leadership likewise made clear that it intended to continue its campaign to 
dismantle health care reform. 
Constitutional hearings in the still-Democratic Senate, of course, 
cannot be explained by a partisan desire to call into question the legality of 
the ACA.  These hearings, instead, reflect the personal interest of Judiciary 
Committee members in legal policy questions and the fact that two federal 
courts had invalidated the ACA.  Also, and perhaps most importantly, the 
 
2011. This number was based on a search of the LEXIS CQ Transcription database and Federal News 
Service database.  See Email from Frederick W. Dingledy, supra note 43.  During this same period, a 
search of the Congressional Record resulted in 220 hits.  The search was: “(affordable care act and 
(constitution! Or unconstitution!) and section (house or senate and not digest).”  For additional 
discussion of the specific questions asked in hearings and statements made on the floor of Congress, see 
Memorandum from Brian Kelley, Research Assistant, on Health Care Topic Three: What Congress did 
Post-Enactment (Aug. 18, 2011) (on file with the Northwestern University Law Review).  Finally, 
Democratic leadership (in both the House and Senate, including leaders of committees of relevant 
jurisdiction) and more than one hundred Republicans joined one or more of several amicus briefs on the 
constitutionality of the ACA before the federal courts of appeal.  See id. 
62
  Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 
2011), aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 
F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) (link); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (2010), 
vacated 636 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011). 
63
  See House Republicans Want All Bills to Cite Constitutional Authority, FOX NEWS, Sept. 17, 
2010, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/09/17/house-republicans-want-bill-cite-constitutional-
authority/ (link).  The rise of the Tea Party as a politically powerful Republican constituency propelled 
these constitutional arguments and initiatives.  See Zietlow, supra note 4, at 1395–1401. 
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fact that the ACA was law made these hearings largely a post-enactment 
sideshow.  In particular, although party polarization has resulted in a 
decline in constitutional hearings, lawmakers also schedule constitutional 
hearings in response to exogenous factors—most notably, changes in party 
leadership and court decisions.64  This is especially true for the Judiciary 
Committees, as these committees are dominated by policy-oriented lawyers 
personally interested in constitutional questions.65  Before the enactment of 
the ACA, for reasons spelled out Part II, Democratic leadership had no 
interest in constitutional hearings that might cut into the fragile majority 
coalition.  After enactment of the ACA, however, there was little reason for 
Senate Democratic leadership to shut the Judiciary Committee out.  Fears of 
derailing the bill gave way to the Senate Judiciary Committee’s desire to 
pursue high-visibility constitutional hearings.  With lawmakers increasingly 
leaving it to courts to settle constitutional disputes,66 it is not surprising that 
party leaders would correspondingly acquiesce to Judiciary Committee 
hearings at a time when the ACA was before the courts and not the 
Congress. 
Party polarization figures prominently in this story.  In particular, 
polarization contributes to both declining legislative interest in 
constitutional questions and increasing lawmaker acceptance of judicial 
supremacy—both of which would cut against hearings before but not after 
enactment of the ACA.67  Polarization also contributes to minority party 
efforts to cast constitutional doubts on majority party initiatives (so that the 
majority would resist constitutional hearings unless the issue—voting 
rights, for example—clearly implicated the Constitution and, with it, the 
Judiciary Committees).  It was therefore expected that a change in party 
control of the House and two federal court rulings that the ACA was 
unconstitutional would spur the House and Senate Judiciary Committees to 
hold hearings about its constitutionality.68 
Expected, yes, but also unfortunate.  At the risk of understatement, 
Congress would be better served thinking about the constitutionality of its 
handiwork pre-enactment, not post-enactment.  Not only will enacted 
legislation have a stronger constitutional foundation if lawmakers consider 
possible constitutional objections, lawmakers also send important signals to 
the Court when they seriously consider a bill’s constitutionality before 
enactment.  They signal, for example, that courts should adhere to the 
 
64
  See Devins, supra note 2, at 770–75.  These exogenous factors, as discussed in Party 
Polarization, do not explain the general decline in constitutional hearings.  Instead, they call attention to 
both reasons why hearings are held and why, on occasion, the number of hearings spike-up in some 
years.  See id. at 768–75; see also supra notes 17, 21. 
65
  See Devins, supra note 2, at 778–79. 
66
  See id. at 763–64. 
67
  See supra notes 21–24. 
68
  The general rise in lawmaker interest in the constitutionality of the ACA, discussed supra note 61 
is also tied to these factors. 
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presumption of constitutionality.69  They also signal a greater commitment 
to their bills and a greater willingness to resist perceived judicial 
encroachments on their authority.  In my forthcoming essay in the print 
version of the Northwestern University Law Review, I will elaborate on 
these claims of congressional signaling.  For the remainder of this Essay, 
however, I will explain why the ACA would have been a stronger bill if 
Congress had paid more attention to its constitutional underpinnings. 
To start, even though the ACA is likely constitutional under existing 
Supreme Court standards,70 government lawyers nonetheless would have an 
easier time defending the statute if Congress purposefully engaged in 
constitutional analysis, including constitutional fact-finding.  For example, 
if lawmakers had held hearings to document that the uninsured are 
inevitably part of the national health insurance marketplace, and then wrote 
a committee report that referenced those hearings, then government lawyers 
would have had a much richer legislative record from which to build their 
case.  Instead, government lawyers defending the ACA made use of a 
collage of academic studies and brief references to the legislative record 
(including floor statements in the absence of formal reports and insightful 
committee hearings).71 
Furthermore, although Congress made several important findings to 
support claims that the bill is “economic” and “substantially affects” 
interstate commerce, lawmakers could have made additional findings to 
strengthen its constitutional foundation.  There are no specific findings on 
the costs that the uninsured impose on the national health care 
marketplace.72  Likewise, apart from the question of whether the individual 
mandate is economic in nature, there are no findings that the ACA 
requirement that individuals purchase health insurance is “necessary and 
proper” to a well-functioning national health insurance system.73 
 
69
  Consider, for example, Justice Scalia’s attack on the presumption of constitutionality in the face 
of (what Justice Scalia thought was) shoddy legislative drafting.  For Justice Scalia, “if Congress is 
going to take the attitude that it will do anything it can get away with and let the Supreme Court worry 
about the Constitution,” then “perhaps th[e] presumption [that  acts of Congress are  constitutional] is 
unwarranted.” Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Tipping Point, 32 NAT’L J. 1810, 1811 (2000), available at 
http://nationaljournal.com/magazine/judiciary-the-tipping-point-20000610 (link). 
70
  See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text. 
71
  For a discussion of the Department of Justice’s arguments, see supra note 59. 
72
  The ACA does include findings that the individual mandate will “broaden the health insurance 
risk pool to include healthy individuals, which will lower health insurance premiums” and, in so doing, 
create “effective health insurance markets.”  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-148, 124 Stat. 119  (2010), amended by Health Care and Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(G)) (link).  On the question of 
whether Congress could have made additional findings, including the estimated costs of “lost 
productivity due to the diminished health and shorter life span of the uninsured” and the potential 
relevance of such findings to Supreme Court decision-making, see CRS REPORT, supra note 50, at 8. 
73
  This type of finding would correspond to Justice Scalia’s invocation of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause in a 2005 ruling upholding a federal ban on medical marijuana in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 
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Congress’s seeming indifference to the bill’s constitutionality is 
underscored by the fact that the bill makes no reference to the Commerce 
Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, or Congress’s taxing power.  
Lawmakers never examined these three sources of congressional power in 
congressional hearings—though they did make their way into some House 
committee reports.74  And while Congress was under no obligation to 
formally cite these powers (since congressional findings, lawmaker 
statements, and congressional reports make clear that Congress was relying 
on these sources of authority),75 Congress should have made explicit 
mention of them.  It cannot help the bill’s chances when its defenders—
academic amici and the Department of Justice—must invest substantial 
effort in explaining why, for example, “the Taxation Clause does not 
require Congress to use any particular labels or expressly invoke the 
taxation power.”76 
Congress’s failure to engage constitutional issues when enacting the 
ACA is a troubling consequence of party polarization.  Majority leaders in 
Congress worked hard to keep their coalition together.  They could not risk 
committee hearings that called into question the bill’s constitutional 
underpinnings.  The fact that these hearings might have reinforced the bill’s 
constitutional foundation did not matter.77  More generally, for reasons 
detailed in Part I of this Essay, party polarization depresses congressional 
committee interest in the Constitution.  The ACA debates exemplify this 
phenomenon. 
In this respect, lawmakers are getting what they asked for.  The 
Supreme Court will soon settle the constitutionality of the ACA.  For their 
 
36 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (link).  For a discussion of the link between Justice Scalia’s Raich 
concurrence and the ACA, see CRS REPORT, supra note 50, at 8 & n.41. 
74
  See supra note 43 and accompanying text (noting that Senate Reports made no references to 
sources of constitutional authority and that some—but not all—House Reports referenced sources of 
congressional power). 
75
  See, e.g., Brief for Appellants, supra note 3, at 25–32, 53; Brief of Constitutional Law Professors 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellant at 16–21, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. 
Florida, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted 132 S.Ct. 604 (2011) (Nos. 11-11021 & 11-
11067), 2011 WL 1461597. 
76
  Id. at 16. 
77
  I have suggested some ways that Congress could have improved the ACA’s chances through 
additional fact-finding or the explicit invocation of the constitutional sources of congressional power.  
Hearings, moreover, might have called attention to other ways that Congress could have enacted a bill 
more resilient to constitutional attack, including, for example, the use of tax incentives instead of 
penalties, the use of the Spending Power, and the use of its taxing power to levy a tax and use the 
revenues to provide health insurance to the uninsured.  Some of these options were mentioned in the 
CRS REPORT, supra note 50, at 2–3.  Of course, these options may well have been politically untenable 
(even if they were clearly constitutional).  See Adam Liptak, Some Common Ground for Legal 
Adversaries on Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/30/us/health-care-adversaries-have-common-ground.html (noting that 
both sides of the litigation agree that Congress could constitutionally impose a tax and disperse revenues 
to provide nation-wide health insurance) (link). 
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part, lawmakers have filed numerous amicus briefs regarding the Act’s 
constitutionality.  And while such jawboning is understandable, lawmakers 
may have influenced the Court more profoundly by paying attention to the 
Act’s constitutionality ex-ante rather than ex-post.  The fact that majority 
party lawmakers thought the risks too great to pursue such a strategy is a 
sad and fitting end to an Essay about the costs of party polarization on 
congressional constitutional deliberation. 
 
 
